Audit every published subdomain with bulk trust checks
Australian organisations often accumulate more online identities than their current DNS zone suggests. Legacy campaign websites, hosted marketing tools and abandoned microsites may continue using .com.au or .au domains after teams believe they have been retired. To audit every subdomain that your company has ever published in DNS, combine historical evidence with sender reputation and email authentication checks.
Trusted Sender Score, operated by Zulu Labs Inc., helps teams perform this review at scale through bulk domain checking, DKIM and DMARC testing, reputation checks and anti-spoofing guidance. The result is a practical inventory of domains that could affect phishing exposure, customer trust or unauthorised email activity.
Reconstruct the full domain inventory
Start with passive DNS records, certificate transparency logs, registrar exports, email marketing platforms and cloud account histories. Search company names, former brand names, common hostnames and known service providers. DNS history can reveal names that no longer resolve but remain referenced in emails, certificates or online documents.
Normalise every result into a canonical hostname list while retaining its source and discovery date. Include apex domains, vanity domains, regional hostnames and certificate names. This prevents duplicated checking and shows whether a domain was recently active or has remained dormant for years.
Marketing records deserve particular attention because old campaign links frequently point to forgotten senders. That list should feed a wider review of domain reputation, as this sender trust guidance explains. Domains used only for newsletters still need authentication because recipients may see them beside legitimate company communications.
Gather DNS and certificate evidence
Capture SPF, DKIM and DMARC records for every discovered sending hostname. Record the destination domains, selectors, policy settings and reporting addresses rather than relying on a screenshot from a particular date. Archived DNS snapshots help distinguish current configuration from obsolete records that may still be trusted by mail systems.
Certificate transparency records can expose active and historical subdomains without direct access to the DNS provider. They are especially valuable for finding staging systems, development portals and short-lived campaign domains. However, certificate evidence alone does not prove that a hostname currently resolves or sends email, so verify it against passive DNS and live queries.
Map each hostname to its business owner, technical owner and intended function. Separate public-facing websites from transactional mail, marketing mail, redirects and test infrastructure. That functional context determines whether a weak record requires immediate remediation or simply an inventory update.
Run bulk trust checks
Submit the normalised domain list to a bulk domain checker rather than testing each address in isolation. Look for sender trust scores, suspicious domain indicators, mail authentication failures and references to known phishing or spoofing activity. Preserve the raw results alongside timestamps so later teams can reproduce the audit.
Developers can use the platform’s API and developer tools to add trust verification to internal workflows, ticketing systems or deployment pipelines. A useful pattern is to check a domain before approving a new DNS change and again after production release.
Treat reputation findings as triage evidence rather than automatic proof of compromise. A low score may reflect a newly registered domain, a recently reclaimed brand or a shared mailing platform. Combine it with DNS age, sending activity, certificate records and the organisation’s own ownership history before making a decision.
Prioritise active and high-risk assets
Place domains currently used for transactional or bulk email at the top of the review. These may include billing notices, account alerts, customer support replies and Australian online retail campaigns. Sydney and Melbourne teams commonly use separate campaign and transactional domains, making it important to confirm which records protect each stream.
Next investigate dangling DNS, missing domain ownership and subdomain takeover exposure. A retired hostname that still points to a deallocated cloud service can allow an outsider to publish content under the company’s namespace. Compare historical records with current MX, CNAME and storage targets, and remove obsolete references.
For organisations operating across Brisbane, Adelaide or Perth, local market campaigns may add further regional domains and agencies. Avoid assuming every unfamiliar hostname is malicious; some may be agency-managed or supplier-created. Confirm ownership, then include legitimate results in the audit so unknown assets do not remain hidden.
Automate recurring trust monitoring
Create a scheduled process that compares the approved domain inventory with new passive DNS, certificate and certificate transparency findings. Record additions, removals and changes in authentication records. Owners should receive alerts when a hostname appears without an approved purpose or when a retired domain becomes active again.
The workflow should extend beyond one-off audits because sender reputation and certificate issuance can change quickly. Teams can follow this guide to automated weekly checks for operational patterns, escalation rules and reporting responsibilities.
Schedule jobs in UTC, then document the local implications. A 02:00 UTC run occurs at noon in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane during daylight saving time, but at 10:00 in Perth and 11:30 in Adelaide on other days. This avoids surprising Australian support teams and accommodates the country’s multiple time zones.
Remediate, retire and document findings
Translate each failed check into a named action. Correct SPF authorises, restore valid DKIM keys, publish a suitable DMARC policy and remove DNS references to retired services. Where no legitimate email remains, revoke sending permissions and close the associated cloud resources before archiving the domain evidence.
The review becomes clearer when each signal is translated into a specific response:
| Evidence | What it indicates | Practical response |
|---|---|---|
| SPF failure | The host is not authorised to send for the domain | Correct authorised senders or retire the hostname |
| DKIM failure | Messages cannot be cryptographically attributed | Rotate and publish a valid signing key |
| DMARC failure | Visible senders are not protected by policy | Publish or repair the DMARC record |
| Poor sender reputation | The domain has adverse trust or abuse signals | Investigate activity, then isolate or retire it |
| Stale DNS reference | A retired service remains linked | Remove the record and revoke the destination |
Record every decision, including reasons for accepting a risk or retaining an unusual domain. This creates an auditable defence for security, marketing and infrastructure teams while helping the organisation identify repeat problems. It also supports incident response if the Australian Cyber Security Centre or ACSC Scamwatch later asks for evidence about suspicious communications.